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Aggregation Bias
Abstract
We propose an axiomatic approach to a decision
maker’s information aggregation problem. This ax-
iomatic analysis provides a positive model of the deci-
sion maker’s evidence assessment process, wherein sub-
mitted credible evidence is aggregated into an overall
assessment that is responsive to the individual assess-
ments provided. We show that the axiomatic approach
produces a two-parameter family of functions and the
parameters of the aggregation function have natural in-
terpretations as the decision maker’s bias against the in-
formation provider’s report and the breadth of the inter-
pretation of the decision maker’s perspective. We con-
sider two different applications and provide empirical
evidence that the decision makers use this form of infor-
mation aggregation in practice.
1. Introduction
Information aggregation is critical for firms due to
its effect on fundamental operations and marketing de-
cisions. For instance, in many supply chains, suppliers
use demand forecast information provided by their cus-
tomers together with their own estimates to determine
their production capacity. However, such critical infor-
mation sharing practices are usually prone to strategic
manipulations like overoptimistic forecasts, which are
pervasive across industries from electronics and semi-
conductors to medical equipment and commercial air-
craft ( [2], [7], [10], [11]). The cost of such inflated fore-
casts from customers to ensure abundant supply capac-
ity can be significant for the manufacturers: [3] shows
that inflated customer forecasts caused $2.1 billion ex-
cess inventory costs in 2001 for the major networking
equipment supplier Cisco.
In response to strategic manipulation incentives or
biased views of the information providers, the decision
makers tend to be skeptical about the quality of shared
information. For instance, in the retailing industry,
category captainship is a common management prac-
tice where one of the leading manufacturers provides
recommendations regarding the strategic category de-
cisions such as pricing, promotion, shelf management,
and assortment decisions. However, category captain-
ship practices vary in terms of the extent to which the
retailer implements captain’s recommendations: At one
end of the spectrum, some retailers use their category
captains’ recommendations as they are; at the other end,
some retailers filter the recommendations provided by
their captains and verify their appropriateness before im-
plementing the recommendations [13]. As an another
example from the automotive industry, [10] reports that
General Motors “purifies” the demand forecast informa-
tion received from its dealers before using it to decide on
the component capacity of its assembly lines. Such con-
flicting incentives and interactions of supply chain firms
prevent effective information sharing and, as a result, the
supply chain suffers from sub-optimal operational deci-
sions (e.g., having too much inventory or missing poten-
tial demand).
A decision maker who receives a potentially non-
reliable information from an outside firm needs to con-
sider a way to aggregate all the available information
into a final assessment. The way of achieving final as-
sessment, or simply assessment process, typically in-
volves behavioral components. For instance, in many
forecast information sharing arrangements, trust and
trustworthiness play a key role because it is impossi-
ble to envision all contingencies and write a complete
set of contracts to eliminate all possible vulnerabilities
business partners face or to account for all uncertainties
throughout the relationship [12]. To illustrate, consider
a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (he) and a
retailer (she). The manufacturer may rely on the down-
stream retailer’s demand forecast to secure capacity be-
fore receiving binding purchase orders from the retailer.
The retailer possesses better forecast information than
the manufacturer because of her proximity to the market.
However, the retailer often has an incentive to inflate her
forecast information to ensure abundant supply. In such
a setup, the manufacturer’s final assessment about the
consumer demand depends on the level of trust the man-
ufacturer puts into the retailer’s forecast. The manufac-
Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/60115
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Page 6800
turer may choose to trust or ignore the retailer’s forecast
completely, or adjust her own judgement with the newly
available forecast information. Thus, the manufacturer’s
final assessment decision on the market demand needs to
internalize his trust behavior.
From a theoretical perspective, to mimic the be-
havioral aspects of information aggregation, it is com-
mon to model an uncertainty facing decision maker as
a Bayesian agent; that is, the decision maker uses the
information provided by its business partner to estimate
the true state of the world in a very specific way. How-
ever, inasmuch as the information providers’ informa-
tion can be regarded as the outcome of strategic search
processes in which the decision maker observes only
the evidence actually presented, there is a huge amount
of “missing data,” which would tend to make Bayesian
inference highly prior-dependent. For instance, there
may be relevant evidence that is available but not pre-
sented due to the information provider’s manipulation
incentives (e.g., inflated forecasts from retailers to en-
sure abundant supply capacity). Relevant evidence may
also be ruled inadmissible with respect to the decision
maker’s evidentiary standard (e.g., information purifi-
cation by General Motors). Another aspect of missing
data is the extent of the information provider’s “effort”
(e.g., how much time/energy/money the business partner
spent on the search for evidence). Finally, the under-
lying true state or the world, which presumably affects
the information provider’s ability to find (and the cost
of) exculpatory evidence, is unobservable to the deci-
sion maker. To use a Bayesian model of decision maker,
one must substitute a subjective prior distribution for all
of this “missing data.” In addition to theoretical con-
siderations above, laboratory studies such as [6], [9],
and [11] show that participants do not use Bayes’ rule to
update their beliefs and the decision maker’s bias on the
reported information affects the aggregation outcome.
Therefore, we conjecture that a decision maker who re-
ceives information from different sources follows a sig-
nificantly simpler rule than Bayes’ rule to generate a fi-
nal assessment about decision uncertainty.
In this paper, we propose an axiomatic approach to
the decision maker’s information aggregation problem.
The purpose of this axiomatic analysis is twofold. First,
it provides a positive model of the decision maker’s ev-
idence assessment process, wherein submitted credible
evidence is aggregated into an overall assessment that
is responsive to the individual assessments provided.
Second, the analysis produces a two-parameter fam-
ily of functions that aggregates the submitted evidence
into the decision maker’s assessment. These parameters
have natural interpretations as the decision maker’s bias
against the information provider’s report and the breadth
of the interpretation of the decision maker’s perspective.
Thus, we provide a non-Bayesian information aggrega-
tion methodology that is consistent with the natural re-
strictions of information aggregation.
To understand the impact of information aggrega-
tion process on firm decisions, we apply our aggrega-
tion methodology to two different settings. In the first
setting, we consider a forecast sharing model in which a
manufacturer may rely on the downstream retailer’s de-
mand forecast to secure capacity before receiving bind-
ing purchase orders from the retailer. Specifically, we
characterize how the manufacturer’s aggregation pro-
cess affects his belief update about the private forecast
information given the retailer’s report. This characteri-
zation provides effective prescriptions for forecast man-
agement and contracting strategies for actual business
environments where behavioral components of decision
making matters. In the second setting, we empirically
examine how prior product reviews affect the purchas-
ing decisions of consumers. We focus on identifying
whether consumers show any aggregation bias when
they update their information about a product’s quality.
2. Assessment Generation
In this section, we provide a model of decision
maker’s information aggregation process, wherein cred-
ible evidence from different sources is aggregated into
an overall assessment. Let ξi and ξ j denote the individ-
ual assessments proffered by two information sources
where ξi,ξ j ∈
[
ξ,ξ
]
are bounded below and above by
parameters ξ and ξ, respectively. For example, in the
forecast sharing game analyzed in Section 3.1, the infor-
mation sources are the retailer’s report and the manufac-
turer’s prior information about the demand state. Let Ξ
be the assessment space, that is, Ξ=
[
ξ,ξ
]
×
[
ξ,ξ
]
. Any
point in Ξ represents the pair of assessments summariz-
ing the two cases provided by the information provider i
and j. The decision maker’s assessment process is rep-
resented by the function A(ξi,ξ j) where A : Ξ→
[
ξ,ξ
]
.
In what follows we assume that A is continuous for all
(ξi,ξm)∈ Ξ, and that the indicated properties are to hold
for all (ξi,ξ j) ∈ Ξ.
2.1 Axioms for Aggregation
We assume that the assessment function A should
embody two characteristics: (1) be responsive to the in-
formation provided and (2) reflects a notion of fairness,
meaning that credible information provided by the par-
ties should be used in an unbiased manner.
The first characteristic (responsiveness) is fairly
Page 6801
straightforward to implement, which we do via the prop-
erties of interiority (I) and strict monotonicity (SM).
(I): max{ξi,ξ j} ≥ A(ξi,ξ j)≥min{ξi,ξ j}
(SM): ξ∗i > ξi,ξ
∗
j > ξ j ⇒
A(ξ∗i ,ξ j)> A(ξi,ξ j) and A(ξi,ξ
∗
j)> A(ξi,ξ j)
Interiority argues that the decision maker’s assessment
should lie within the range of assessments provided by
the information providers. To illustrate, suppose that ξi
is greater than ξ j. In this case, the decision maker may
believe that the information provider i’s incentives are
biased upwards and the final assessment should be less
that the i’ report. However, in this case, the decision
maker has no reason to think that the true value of ξ
should be less than ξ j. Note that an implication of in-
teriority is the property of reflexivity: A(ξ,ξ) = ξ, that
is, if the i and j submits information indicating the same
outcome, then the decision maker’s assessment would
be that same level. The second property, strict mono-
tonicity, points out that A is strictly increasing in both ξi
and ξ j. That is, if any new credible information, which
may be presented by the either information providers,
indicates a higher ξ, then the decision maker’s assess-
ment should response to the new evidence by increasing
the final assessment as well, albeit not necessarily at the
same rate. Thus, strong monotonicity implies that the
decision maker does not completely ignore any infor-
mation provided by the sources. This condition can be
interpreted as some form of decision maker’s trust on the
information providers reports.
The second main characteristic (fairness) requires
that the information provided by i and j be treated in
an unbiased manner. We implement this via two further
axioms, unbiasedness (U) and independence of presen-
tation (IP).
(U): A(λξi,λξ j) = λA(ξi,ξ j) ∀λ,0 < λ≤ 1
(IP): ∀ξi1,ξ j1,ξi2,ξ j2,A(A(ξi1,ξ j1),A(ξi2,ξ j2)) =
A(A(ξi1,ξi2),A(ξ j1,ξ j2))
The unbiasedness property is a relative statement requir-
ing that proportional scaling alone of the information
should not influence the outcome disproportionately to-
ward one party or the other. Thus, for example, if i and
j both cut their estimates in half, the decision maker’s
assessment should fall, but there is no obvious reason
why it should fall disproportionately for i or j. The
seemingly natural fairness assumption is that the over-
all assessment should be reduced to half of the original
assessment.
Finally, independence of presentation eliminates the
impact of extraneous factors such as the nature, style,
or sequence of presentation of the cases on the decision
maker’s assessment. To see this, consider the analogy
that i’s information is partitioned (arbitrarily) into two
subsets. The information from the first subset yields the
assessment ξi1 while the information from the remain-
ing subset yields the assessment ξi2. Note that this does
not presume ξi = ξi1 +ξi2, nor does it presume ξi > ξi1
or ξi > ξi2. Similarly, let the subset assessments for j
be denoted by ξ j1 and ξ j2. The independence of presen-
tation property asserts that the decision maker’s assess-
ment process should come to the same conclusion by
comparison of the subsets, followed by comparisons of
the assessments based on the subsets, independently of
how the subsets are compared. In particular, note that on
the left, ξi1 is compared with ξ j1 and ξi2 with ξ j2, while
on the right, ξi1 and ξi2 have been switched. Essentially,
this axiom removes any role of procedural biases (such
as how a case is presented, style of presentation, exis-
tence of technical errors) from the decision maker’s as-
sessment. We are now ready to characterize the decision
maker’s assessment generation function.
Theorem 1. The family of functions, indexed by the pa-
rameters α and β, given by
A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) =

(
αξβi +(1−α)ξβj
)1/β
β 6= 0,α ∈ [0,1];
ξαi ξ
1−α
j β= 0,α ∈ [0,1].
is the unique family of continuous functions satisfying
interiority, strict monotonicity, unbiasedness, and inde-
pendence of presentation.
Theorem 1 shows that any model of aggregation rep-
resented by A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) that satisfies the axioms above
must be a “quasi-arithmetic weighted mean.” Thus, the
decision maker’s final assessment is a weighted aver-
age of information providers’ reports where the weights
are determined by the parameters α and β. A particu-
lar value of α determines the importance of i’s informa-
tion from the decision maker’s perspective. A particular
value of β determines the way the decision maker aver-
ages the reports. That is, β determines what type of av-
eraging methodology the decision maker uses. In partic-
ular, β= 1 corresponds to the weighted arithmetic mean
of ξi and ξ j with weights α and (1−α), respectively.
When β = 0, the decision maker uses the weighted ge-
ometric mean and when β=−1, the final assessment is
the weighted harmonic mean. Finally, β→ −∞ yields
the minimum of ξi and ξ j and β→ ∞ yields the maxi-
mum of ξi and ξ j.
Note that we do not restrict an information provider’s
report to be a single deterministic point. For instance, an
information provider’s report can be modeled as a ran-
dom variable that is supported on some range of poten-
tial ξ values. We also allow any type of correlation or
causation between the reports. For example, we do not
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Figure 1: Change of A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) in ξi when ξ j = 1/2,
α= 1/2, and β ∈ {−10,1,10}.
assume that an information provider’s report is indepen-
dent from the other information provider’s report; i.e.,
we allow for the cases where ξi is a function of ξ j and
vice versa.
2.2 Properties of Aggregation Function
Next, we characterize how the manufacturer’s final
assessment function reacts to the retailer’s report as well
as to the model parameters.
Proposition 2.
(i) A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) is a convex (concave) increasing
function of ξi when β≥ 1 (β≤ 1).
(ii) A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) is increasing in β for all α ∈ (0,1)
and ξi 6= ξ j.
(iii) A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) is increasing (decreasing) in α for all
β ∈ (−∞,∞) and ξr ≥ ξm ( ξr < ξm). Moreover,
A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) is convex (concave) in α when β≥ 1
(β≤ 1).
The first part of Proposition 2 shows that the decision
maker’s final assessment is an increasing function of the
information providers’ reports. However, the increase
in the final assessment is not always linear. Depending
on the value of β, the decision maker’s assessment may
be a convex or concave function of the reports. Figure
1 demonstrates the impact of information provider i’s
report on the decision maker’s final assessment for dif-
ferent values of α and β. The solid line in Figure 1 rep-
resents the case where β= 1 so that the decision maker’s
final assessment is linear in ξi. Most information shar-
ing models in the literature uses a setup where the final
assessment is a linear function of the informed agent’s
report and the decision maker’s own prior (e.g., mod-
els with Bayesian decision maker). However, Propo-
sition 2 demonstrates that when β > 1 (respectively,
β< 1), these models under-estimate (respectively, over-
estimate) the final assessment provided by our axiomatic
approach.
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Figure 2: Change of A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) in α and β.
The second part of Proposition 2 demonstrates how
the decision maker’s final assessment reacts to the
changes in β. Intuitively, β has a natural interpreta-
tion as the breadth of the decision maker’s interpreta-
tion on the reported information. A narrow interpreta-
tion means that, for any given pair (ξi,ξ j), the decision
maker’s assessment will be lower than under a broad in-
terpretation. Since A(ξi,ξ j;α,β) is increasing in β by
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Proposition 2(ii), low values of β can be interpreted as
reflecting a narrow interpretation, while higher values
of β reflect progressively broader interpretations. Figure
2(b) demonstrates how a change in the decision maker’s
interpretation impacts the final assessment for different
levels of α.
A natural interpretation of α is that it represents the
decision maker’s relative confidence in the information
providers’ reports. In particular, if α = 1, the deci-
sion maker considers that i’ report is completely reliable,
whereas if α = 0, the decision maker considers that i’s
report is completely unreliable. Proposition 2(iii) shows
that the real effect of α depends on the decision maker’s
interpretation; i.e., the precise value of β. Figure 2(a)
demonstrates how a change in the decision maker’s con-
fidence on the i’s report impacts the final assessment
for different levels of interpretation. When the decision
maker’s interpretation is broad enough (i.e., β > 1), the
final assessment is more reactive to the high values of
α. On the other hand, when the decision maker’s in-
terpretation is relatively narrow (i.e., β < 1), the final
assessment is more reactive to the low values of α. Only
when β = 1, the final assessment is a linear function of
α and the decision maker’s interpretation does not play
any role in the final assessment.
3. Applications
In this section, we aim to understand the impact of
aggregation function derived in the previous section on
two different settings in which aggregating different set
of informations is required.
3.1 The Forecast Sharing Model
Consider a newsvendor model where a retailer (she)
and a manufacturer (he) who interact under a whole-
sale price contract. The manufacturer builds capac-
ity before demand is realized. We consider a demand
model similar to [11]. In particular, demand is given by
D = µ+ ξ+ ε, where µ is a positive constant denoting
the average market demand and ε is the market uncer-
tainty. Both parties know µ, and they also know that
ε is a zero-mean random variable with cumulative dis-
tribution function (c.d.f.) F(·) and probability density
function (p.d.f.) f (·) supported on [ε,ε]. The parameter
ξ represents the retailer’s private forecast information.
The retailer may have obtained this information because
of her proximity to the market. The manufacturer’s be-
lief about ξ is denoted by ξm, which is common knowl-
edge.
The sequence of events is as follows: (i) the retailer
observes the private forecast ξ and reports her forecast
information as ξr; (ii) by using all available information
(ξr and ξm), the manufacturer generates a final assess-
ment about ξ and builds capacity K at unit cost cK > 0;
(iii) demand D is realized and the retailer places an or-
der; (iv) the manufacturer produces min{D,K} at unit
cost c > 0 and charges w per unit delivered; (v) the re-
tailer receives the order and sells at a fixed unit price
r > 0. To ensure production is profitable, we assume
r > c+ cK and w ∈ [c+ cK ,r]. Under this model struc-
ture, the expected profits of the retailer and manufacturer
for a given K and ξ are
Πr(K,ξ) = (r−w)Eε[min{µ+ξ+ ε,K}]
Πm(K,ξ) = (w− c)Eε[min{µ+ξ+ ε,K}]− cKK
If the manufacturer knew ξ (i.e., ξm = ξ with probabil-
ity one), then he would maximize his expected profit by
setting capacity as
K(ξ) = µ+ξ+F−1
(
w− c− cK
w− c
)
.
However, the manufacturer does not know ξ and the re-
tailer has an incentive to distort (and possibly inflate)
her report of ξ. Since the retailer’s profit Πr(K,ξ) is
increasing in the manufacturer’s capacity choice K, it
is in the best interest of the retailer to induce the man-
ufacturer to build a large capacity to ensure abundant
supply. Anticipating the retailer’s incentive, the man-
ufacturer would not find the reported forecast credible
regardless of whether the retailer tells the truth.
We analyze this forecast sharing game under the as-
sumption that the manufacturer uses A(ξr,ξm;α,β) to
generate his assessment on the market uncertainty. In
this setup, there are two decisions in sequence: the re-
tailer’s report and the manufacturer’s choice of capacity.
In the first stage, the retailer observes the private fore-
cast ξ and reports her forecast information as ξr. In the
second stage, the manufacturer updates his beliefs ac-
cording his assessment process A(ξr,ξm;α,β) and builds
capacity K. We analyze this forecast sharing game us-
ing backward induction and characterize first the manu-
facturer’s optimal capacity decision followed by the re-
tailer’s optimal report strategy.
3.1.1. Analysis with Independent Reports. Suppose
that the manufacturer’s own judgement ξm is a point esti-
mate; i.e., ξm ∈ [ξ,ξ]. Given ξr and ξm, the manufacturer
decides on the capacity level to maximize his expected
profit by solving
max
K
(w− c)Eε [min{µ+A(ξr,ξm;α,β)+ ε,K}]− cKK
In this setup, the manufacturer’s optimal capacity deci-
sion balances the marginal cost of adding extra capacity
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with the marginal expected benefit of increasing sales
under the manufacturer’s belief structure on the retailer’s
report.
Proposition 3.
(i) The manufacturer’s unique optimal capacity is
K∗ = µ+A(ξr,ξm;α,β)+F−1
(
w− c− cK
w− c
)
.
(ii) K∗ is increasing in ξr and decreasing in cK .
(iii) K∗ is increasing in β for all ξr 6= ξm and increasing
(decreasing) in α for all ξr ≥ ξm ( ξr < ξm).
The first part of Proposition 3 provides the manufac-
turer’s optimal capacity decision. The second part of
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal capacity decision
is positively correlated with the retailer”s report and re-
ducing capacity cost yields higher capacity. These re-
sults are consistent with the experimental evidence pro-
vided by [11]. The last part of Proposition 3 demon-
strates the impact of the manufacturer’s belief structure
on his capacity choice. In particular, if the manufac-
turer’s interpretation of provided evidences about ξ be-
comes broader, then his optimal capacity increases. On
the other hand, if his confidence on the retailer’s report
increases, then his optimal capacity decision moves to-
wards to the outcome that the retailer’s report suggests.
In the first stage, anticipating the manufacturer’s op-
timal capacity strategy, the retailer maximizes her own
profit by choosing a report ξr. As in [11], we assume
that there is a cost of providing ξr for the retailer to cap-
ture the retailer’s trustworthiness by the disutility of de-
ception. This disutility of deception can be viewed as
a psychological cost derived from the retailer’s aversion
to being caught in deceit. In particular, we assume that
the cost of generating report ξr is κ|ξr−ξ|when the true
demand state is characterized by ξ. The parameter κ> 0
controls the retailer’s incentive to misreport her private
forecast. Notice that a retailer with a higher κ is more
trustworthy because she incurs a higher disutility when
giving the same amount of information distortion as a
retailer with a lower κ. Then, the retailer solves
max
ξr
(r−w)Eε[min{µ+ξ+ ε,K∗}]−κ|ξr−ξ|.
Proposition 4.
(i) The retailer’s optimal reporting strategy, ξ∗r , is such
that
A(ξ∗r ,ξm;α,β) = ξ+(z
∗
r − zm)
where z∗r = F−1
(
(r−w)A′−κ
(r−w)A′
)
, zm =
F−1
(w−c−cK
w−c
)
, and A′ = ∂A(ξ
∗
r ,ξm;α,β)
∂ξr
|ξr=ξ∗r=
α
(
α+(1−α)
(
ξm
ξ∗r
)β) 1−ββ
.
(ii) ξ∗r is increasing in β and it is increasing (decreas-
ing) in α for all ξr ≥ ξm ( ξr < ξm).
Part (i) of Proposition 4 reveals that the retailer’s op-
timal reporting strategy is such that it makes the manu-
facturer’s final assessment equal to the true demand state
plus some adjustment factor. The parameter z∗r denotes
the retailer’s adjustment factor, which is a function of the
retailer’s reporting strategy, and zm denotes the manufac-
turer’s adjustment factor, which is independent from the
retailer’s report. Then, the adjustment that the retailer
makes to the true demand state is z∗r − zm. The man-
ufacturer learns the true demand state with his assess-
ment process (i.e., A(ξ∗r ,ξm;α,β) = ξ) when z∗r = zm. If
z∗r > zm, the manufacturer’s assessment over-estimates
the demand, whereas if z∗r < zm, the final assessment
under-estimates the demand.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows the impact of a
change in the manufacturer’s assessment process on the
retailer’s reporting strategy. In particular, the retailer in-
flates her report more when facing with a manufacturer
whose breadth of interpretation is broader. On the other
hand, if the manufacturer’s confidence on the retailer in-
creases, then it is more likely that the manufacturer’s
final assessment is going to be closer to the retailer’s re-
port.
3.1.2. Analysis with Dependent Reports. Our model
in Section 3.1 assumes that the manufacturer’s own
judgement is a point estimate that is independent from
the retailer’s report. Now, we relax this assumption by
considering a setup where the manufacturer’s judgement
is a function of the retailer’s report; i.e., ξm = h(ξr)
where h is continuous function that maps each retailer’s
report to a belief structure. We do not put any struc-
ture on the shape of manufacturer’s judgement. For in-
stance, the manufacturer’s judgement can be a point es-
timate that depends on the retailer’ report (e.g., h(ξr) =
E[ξ | ξr]) or it can be a random variable where the do-
main of the random variable is a function of the re-
tailer’ report. The “trust-embedded” model of Ozer et
al. (2011) is an example for the latter case. In their
setup, the manufacturer updates his belief on ξ via the
rule αξr +(1−α)h(ξr) where h(ξr) follows the distri-
bution of ξ truncated on [ξ,ξr].
In this section, we assume that β= 1 and the retailer
knows the structure of h(·) for simplicity. Then, given ξr
and h(·), the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s expected
payoffs are
Πˆm = (w− c)Eε [min{µ+A(ξr)+ ε,K}]− cKK
Πˆr = (r−w)Eε[min{µ+ξ+ ε,K}]−κ|ξr−ξ|
where A(ξr) = αξr + (1− α)h(ξr). The sequence of
events is the same as that in Section 3.1. In particu-
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lar, there are two decisions in sequence: the retailer’s
report and the manufacturer’s choice of capacity. As be-
fore, we analyze the model using backward induction
and characterize first the manufacturer’s optimal capac-
ity decision followed by the retailer’s optimal forecast
report.
Proposition 5. In the equilibrium of the model with re-
port dependent manufacturer judgement, the manufac-
turer’s unique optimal capacity is
Kˆ(ξˆ∗r ,α) = µ+αξˆ
∗
r +G
−1
(
w− c− cK
w− c | ξˆ
∗
r ,α
)
where G
(
· | ξˆ∗r ,α
)
is the c.d.f. for (1− α)h(ξˆ∗r ) + ε
given ξˆ∗r and α, and the retailer’s optimal reporting
strategy, ξˆ∗r , is such that
Kˆ(ξˆ∗r ,α) = ξ+ Aˆ(ξˆ
∗
r ,α)+F
−1
(
(r−w)Kˆ′(ξˆ∗r ,α)−κ
(r−w)Kˆ′(ξˆ∗r ,α)
)
where Kˆ′(ξˆ∗r ,α) =
∂Kˆ(ξˆr ,α)
∂ξˆr
|ξˆr=ξˆ∗r .
Proposition 5 generalizes the results in Section 3.1
for the cases where the manufacturer’s own judgment
is a function of the retailer’s report. The proposi-
tion demonstrates that the incentive conflict between the
manufacturer and retailer can be measured by the differ-
ence between the adjustment factors of each firm.
3.2 Customer Reviews.
The second application we consider focuses on the
impact of assessment function on the customer reviews,
which are increasingly important to marketing. Re-
search has shown that ( [5], [4], [8]) past reviews have
impacts on future ones. In this section, we adapt the in-
formation aggregation rule to the dynamics of reviews,
and analyze empirical review data to determine if the
model is supported.
3.2.1. Dynamical Model with Step-wise Aggregation.
Consider a setting where a particular product receives
a sequence of reviews from unique individuals (i.e., no
individual submits more than one review). We assume
the private assessment of the product xi for individual i
is a real number and distributed i.i.d. with some cumu-
lative distribution Fx. We further assume that an indi-
vidual is influenced by the past reviews, and his “result-
ing” assessment is an aggregation between his private
assessment, xi, and some characteristics of the past as-
sessments. For the purpose of this discussion, we will
limit our attention to the mean of past assessments, x¯.
The formulation is general and can be extended to other
characteristics, such as the most recent assessment.
The model strategy is to derive the distribution of the
observed reviews from the basic assumptions of the re-
view process, which allows us to use the maximum like-
lihood method to estimate the parameters of the model
from empirical data. Using the aggregation rule, the re-
sulting assessment, y, is given by:
y = A(xi, x¯;α,β) =
(
αxβi +(1−α)x¯β
)1/β
The cumulative distribution of y, using the change of
variable xi =
(
yβ−(1−α)x¯β
α
)1/β
, is:
Fy(z) = Fx
( zβ− (1−α)x¯β
α
)1/β
The parameter α decides how much weight an individ-
ual will place on his private assessment. If α = 1, the
individual does not use any past assessment and only
rely on his/her own private assessment xi. If α = 1,
the individual has no opinion and uses the assessment
x¯ from the past. The parameter β controls whether the
response to assessments (private or past) to be concave
(β < 1) or convex (β > 1). A concave/convex response
can be interpreted as the individual to be more sensitive
to changes in low/high assessments.
3.2.2. Reporting Bias. Past research ( [1], [4], [8]) has
shown that individuals do not always report their as-
sessments of products as reviews, and that their propen-
sity of doing so is not independent of their assessments.
Specifically, the satisfaction theory ( [1]) argues that an
individual is more likely to report his assessment (i.e.
post a review) if his/her final assessment (y) is further
away from the average (x¯). That is, the motivation to
“chime in” is stronger when the individual is disagree-
ing with the average opinion.
We operationalize this idea with a probability of re-
viewing, given by:
P(review) = p0+(1− p0)
(
1− e−γ(y−x¯)2
)
Where p0 and γ are parameters of the model. When the
individual agrees with the average assessment, y− x¯= 0,
and P(review) = p0. In this case, p0 can be interpreted
as the minimum probability of reviewing. When the in-
dividual disagrees with the average assessment strongly,
(y− x¯)2→∞, and P(review) = 1. That is, the individual
will review with probability 1.
3.2.3. Review Data. Consumer reviews were collected
from one of the most popular media website on tech-
nology and consumer electronics — CNET.com. We
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used a web scrawling software package BeautifulSoup
in Python. Top brands in the computer category were
selected: HP, Dell, Apple, Sony, Acer and Toshiba. For
each brand, we collected the review scores, and the time
of reviews, plus the product characteristics of all the
products. This complete data set contains 18,840 re-
views on 1,491 products of the 5 brands over a 7-year
period. The data set is described with the statistics pre-
sented in the Table below.
Table 1: Data Description – (P.N.–Product No, R.N.–
Review No., A.R.– Avg. Rating, Stdev. – Stdev. Rating)
Brands P.N. R.N. A.R. Stdev.
Apple 167 6874 3.48 1.45
Dell 193 1050 2.84 1.64
HP 390 3202 2.87 1.61
Sony 659 6930 3.60 1.47
Toshiba 82 784 3.36 1.47
Summary 1491 18840 3.23 1.51
3.2.4. Estimation and Analysis. For a particular prod-
uct, we assume the private assessments of individuals
are distributed with a truncated normal, with mean µ and
standard deviation σ, both to be estimated from the data.
We assume a truncated normal, in the range of [0,5], to
be consistent with the range of the review scores. We
further assume the final assessment y and whether the
individual reviews are conditionally independent. Since
the observed review scores are in the increment of 0.5,
we discretize the model, and the probability of observ-
ing a score s is given by:
P(s) = P(review)P(s−1/2 < y≤ s+1/2)
= P(review)(Fy(s+1/2)−Fy(s−1/2))
This model has 6 parameters: µ, σ, α, β, p0 and γ.
We estimate the 6 parameters by the standard maxi-
mum likelihood method. Let θ = {µ,σ,α,β, p0,γ}. For
a sequence of review scores {s1,s2, ...,sN}, the log-
likelihood function is given by:
L(θ) =
N
∑
i=1
log(P(si|θ))
Note that for each term log(P(si|θ), x¯ = 1i−1 ∑i−1j=1 s j.
3.2.5. Estimation Results and Hypothesis Testing.
We only estimate the model for products with at least
50 review scores to ensure enough statistics. While
the threshold is arbitrary, our main conclusions will not
change if the threshold is increased to 60. The model is
estimated for 72 products. It is not practical to provide
the detailed estimates for all 72 products. Hence, the
main consults will be supported by a summary of the
estimation.
However, to ensure clarity, we first discuss the esti-
mation of a single product: Apple iTunes 7. The fol-
lowing table summarizes the model estimation of this
product.
Table 2: Model Estimation and Hypothesis Testing for
Apple iTunes 7 – (µ–mean of private assessment, σ–s.d.
of private assessment, α–weight on private assessment,
β–nonlinear influence, γ–reporting bias, p0–min proba-
bility to report)
parameter estimate p-value hypothesis
µ 1.9608 NA
σ 2.2927 NA
α 0.8736 0.0000 H0: α= 1
β 1.0902 0.0000 H0: β= 1
γ 0.0002 NA
p0 0.0008 0.0017 H0: p0 = 1
Result 1: The reviews of Apple iTune 7 exhibits nonlin-
ear response from past influence and reporting biases.
We use the likelihood ratio test to determine (i) if
there is any influence from the past average reviews
score (H0: α = 1), (ii) if the influence from the past,
if any, is nonlinear (H0: β = 1) and (iii) if there is any
self-reporting bias (H0: p0 = 1). We find that α is sig-
nificantly below 1 (0.8736) with a p-value that is practi-
cally 0, indicating strong support that there is some in-
fluence from past reviews. β is significantly higher than
1, with a p-value also practically 0. This is strong evi-
dence that this influence from the past is nonlinear. In
addition, p0 is significant below 1 with a p-value below
1%, again indicating strong evidence of a reporting bias,
in this case.
All the products are analyzed in this fashion. Clearly,
these behaviors (influence from the past, nonlinear influ-
ence, reporting bias) are not significant in all the prod-
ucts. We summarizes the aggregate results for the 72
products in the following table.
Result 2: Most products exhibit influence from past re-
views with half of the responses being nonlinear.
The estimated α is significantly less than 1 for 58%
of the products, indicating there is evidence of influence
from past average review score in a majority of the prod-
ucts. Out of these products, roughly half (19 out of 42)
has a significant β. It does worth noting that in all 19
cases, β > 0 consistent with the interpretation that re-
viewers pay more attention to extreme values.
Result 3: Most products exhibit reporting biases.
The estimated p0 is significantly less than 1 for 63%
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Table 3: Model Estimation and Hypothesis Testing for
72 Products
parameter mean s. d. % of products
significant at 5%
µ 2.948 1.277 N/A
σ 2.248 0.673 N/A
α 0.832 0.042 58%
β 1.147 0.204 26%
γ 0.807 0.811 N/A
p0 0.057 0.087 63%
of the products, indicating reporting biases are in a ma-
jority of the products.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider an axiomatic model of
information aggregation. We provide a unique two-
parameter family of information aggregation functions
for a collection of mild axioms on the assessment gen-
eration process. The parameters of the information ag-
gregation function have natural interpretations as certain
types of consistent behavioral biases in the aggregation
process. In order to test the impact of such an aggre-
gation process on the managerial decisions, we consider
two applications from the operations management and
marketing literatures. In both of these applications, in-
formation aggregation is at the core of the decision mak-
ing process. We show how the behavioral biases char-
acterized by the information aggregation function affect
the decision making outcomes in the context of these
two applications. We also provide empirical evidence
that the decision makers use this form of information
aggregation in practice.
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